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When Massachusetts passed its pioneering health
care reforms in 2006, critics warned that they would
result in a slow but steady spiral downward toward a
government-run health care system. Three years later,
those predictions appear to be coming true: 
•Although the state has reduced the number of
residents without health insurance, 200,000
people remain uninsured. Moreover, the in-
crease in the number of insured is primarily
due to the state’s generous subsidies, not the
celebrated individual mandate.
•Health care costs continue to rise much faster
than the national average. Since 2006, total
state health care spending has increased by
28 percent. Insurance premiums have in-
creased by 8–10 percent per year, nearly dou-
ble the national average.
•New regulations and bureaucracy are limit-
ing consumer choice and adding to health
care costs.
•Program costs have skyrocketed. Despite tax in-
creases, the program faces huge deficits. The state
is considering caps on insurance premiums, cuts
in reimbursements to providers, and even the
possibility of a “global budget” on health care
spending—with its attendant rationing.
•A shortage of providers, combined with in-
creased demand, is increasing waiting times to
see a physician.
With the “Massachusetts model” frequently
cited as a blueprint for health care reform, it is
important to recognize that giving the govern-
ment greater control over our health care system
will have grave consequences for taxpayers, pro-
viders, and health care consumers. That is the les-
son of the Massachusetts model.
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Introduction
On April 12, 2006, Massachusetts gover-
nor Mitt Romney signed into law one of the
most far-reaching experiments in health care
reform since President Bill Clinton’s ill-fated
attempt at national health care. The legisla-
tion took full effect on July 1, 2007, meaning
that we now have had sufficient time to eval-
uate its successes and failures. 
The Massachusetts reforms were pioneer-
ing in many respects. Among the key compo-
nents of the bill were
•An Individual Mandate. Perhaps the
most widely discussed aspect of the
Massachusetts reform was its unprece-
dented “individual mandate,” a require-
ment that every Massachusetts resident
have a minimum amount of health
insurance coverage, as defined by the
state. Those who do not receive insur-
ance through their employer or a gov-
ernment plan such as Medicare are
required to purchase it on their own.1
Initially, a failure to comply with this
mandate resulted in the loss of the indi-
vidual’s personal exemption from the
state income tax. That penalty increased
to 50 percent of the cost of a standard
insurance policy, or up to $912 as of July
1, 2008.2
•An Employer Mandate. In addition to
the individual mandate, the Massachu-
setts reform also imposed a mandate on
employers with 10 or more workers. Em-
ployers who fail to provide health insur-
ance to their workers are assessed a $295
fee per employee,3 with additional penal-
ties for employers whose workers repeat-
edly receive uncompensated care.4 And
finally, all employers are required to offer
their employees a Section 125 plan.5
•Middle-Class Subsidies. The reforms
established a new program called Com-
monwealth Care to help families with
incomes up to 300 percent of the poverty
level ($66,150 for a family of four) to pur-
chase insurance.6 The bill also expanded
eligibility for Medicaid. 
•The Connector. The Massachusetts re-
forms also established a new entity, called
the Commonwealth Connector, to re-
structure the individual and small busi-
ness insurance markets.7 Intended as a
way to enable individuals to purchase per-
sonal and portable health insurance on a
pre-tax basis, the Connector authority
has evolved into a regulatory body with
wide-ranging power over insurance in the
state. 
Health reform advocates on both the left
and right have hailed Massachusetts as a mod-
el for reform. Numerous states have consid-
ered similar plans (although to date none have
passed).8
More importantly, the key components of
the Massachusetts plan form the core of pro-
posals for national health care reform. In par-
ticular, both the Obama administration and
congressional Democrats are leaning toward
a plan that includes both an individual and
employer mandate combined with middle-
class subsidies.9 In addition, while he was still
a presidential candidate, Obama called for
the creation of a Connector-like national “ex-
change.”10
But experience so far suggests that the
“Massachusetts model” actually provides an
object lesson in how not to reform health
care. The program has failed even by its own
goal criteria of achieving universal coverage.
It has failed to restrain the growth in health
care costs. And it has greatly exceeded its ini-
tial budget, placing new burdens on the
state’s taxpayers.
At the same time, the Massachusetts Plan
has increased bureaucratic control over the
state’s health care system, limiting consumer
choice. And it has set the stage for still more
state intervention in the future, including
price controls and explicit rationing. 
Health care reformers in other states and at
the federal level should look carefully at the
failures of the Massachusetts model, and learn
from them.
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Expanding Coverage
There is no doubt that the Massachusetts
reforms have reduced the number of people
without health insurance in the state, but by
how much is a matter of considerable dis-
pute. According to official state statistics, the
state’s uninsurance rate declined from 10.4
percent in 2006 to just 2.6 percent today,
leaving just 167,300 state residents without
insurance.11 However, there are several rea-
sons for doubting this number. 
The data show that roughly 80,000 more
people have been added to the Medicaid rolls.
In addition, approximately 176,000 people
were receiving subsidized insurance coverage
through the state’s Commonwealth Care pro-
gram.12 That means 256,000 previously unin-
sured people were being covered through gov-
ernment programs. The more difficult
question is how many uninsured residents
obtained unsubsidized coverage. Here the
state relied on a telephone survey conducted
by the Urban Institute in mid 2008, which esti-
mated an increase in coverage of 187,000 peo-
ple.13 About 40,000 of these purchased indi-
vidual insurance, either through the state’s
Connector or through the residual individual
insurance market outside the Connector. The
other 147,000 received coverage through their
employer. 
Such telephone surveys, however, are noto-
riously unreliable, particularly in the case of
measuring health insurance coverage. For
example, two groups that are much more like-
ly to go without insurance are non-English-
speaking immigrants (both legal and illegal)
and young people. Yet, these groups are far
less likely to be included on telephone sur-
veys: immigrants because of the language bar-
riers and young people because they lack tra-
ditional landline telephones. 
More rigorous surveys have suggested
that the number of uninsured remains far
higher. For example, a door-to-door survey by
the Census Bureau, conducted at roughly the
same time as the Urban Institute’s phone sur-
vey, estimated that 5.4 percent of state resi-
dents were uninsured.14 And an examination
of state income tax returns (filers are
required to certify their health insurance sta-
tus on their returns) showed that roughly 5
percent of residents were uninsured as of
January 1, 2008.15 And, since low-income res-
idents, who are more likely to lack insurance,
are not required to file state taxes, the actual
percentage of uninsured is most likely a per-
centage point or two higher. Those estimates
suggest that more than 200,000 Massa-
chusetts residents remain uninsured.16
Furthermore, if the number of uninsured
in the state had indeed been reduced by 74 per-
cent, as suggested by the state, one might
expect a comparable reduction in the amount
of uncompensated care provided by the state’s
hospitals. In reality, the number of people
receiving uncompensated care has declined by
just 36 percent.17 In fact, one of the original
selling points behind the Massachusetts
reform was that it would shift subsidies for
uncompensated care from hospitals to indi-
viduals. Uncompensated care subsidies were
supposed to fade away, with the state using
the savings to help low- and middle-income
residents buy insurance instead. But hospitals
now say that the rate of uncompensated care
continues to be so high that they cannot dis-
pense with their subsidies. The taxpayers end
up paying twice.
There are also questions about the degree
to which the reduction in the number of
uninsured is sustainable going forward. For
example, the increase in the number of peo-
ple receiving employer-provided health insur-
ance appears anomalous at a time when,
nationwide, businesses are less likely to pro-
vide insurance for their employees. Also, the
faltering economy and increase in unemploy-
ment will almost certainly cut into that num-
ber in the future. In addition, in the face of
skyrocketing subsidy costs, the state is facing
potential cutbacks to its Commonwealth
Care program. It has already instituted eligi-
bility reviews that have removed nearly
25,000 people from the program.18
When Massachusetts passed its reform
plan, its supporters hailed it as a means to pro-
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vide universal health insurance coverage. “All
Massachusetts citizens will have health insur-
ance,” announced then-governor Mitt Rom-
ney.19 Thus, even by the standards of the pro-
gram’s supporters, it has not met its goals.20
It is also important to recognize that, what-
ever the increase in insurance coverage, most
of the increase is due to subsidies, not the
state’s individual mandate. Fully 58 percent of
the newly insured are having that insurance
paid for by the government, either through
Medicaid or Commonwealth Care—proving
that if you give something away for free, peo-
ple are inclined to take it.21 Of the remaining
42 percent, more than three-quarters are
receiving insurance through their employer.22
It is impossible to sort out the share of those
who are receiving insurance as a result of the
employer mandate versus the individual man-
date, or who would have received insurance
even in the absence of any mandate. We do
know that relatively few previously uninsured
individuals who had to purchase their own
insurance did so. It seems clear, therefore, that
the state’s generous subsidies have far more to
do with the increase in insurance than does
the individual mandate. 
The evidence suggests a substantial degree
of adverse selection taking place. Those sign-
ing up for subsidized coverage through the
Commonwealth Care program were in poorer
health than both the population at large and
the previously uninsured population.23 And
younger residents, who composed the largest
group of the uninsured before the mandate
went into effect, continue to make up the
largest group of the uninsured. Slightly more
than 35 percent of the state’s remaining unin-
sured are between the ages of 18 and 25, and
more than 60 percent are under the age of
35.24 Before the mandate, those between the
ages of 18 and 25 made up roughly 30 percent
of the uninsured,25 suggesting that the young
(and presumably more healthy) are less likely
to comply with the mandate. 
One of the rationales for having the man-
date was the belief that extending insurance
to more young and healthy people would
“strengthen and stabilize the functioning of
health insurance risk pools.”26 However, the
combination of subsidies and mandates may
actually be making the pool older and sicker. 
Thus, there seems to be little justification
for an individual mandate. 
Increased Insurance
Regulation/Increased Cost
The proponents of the Massachusetts re-
forms also promised that those reforms would
reduce health care costs. Governor Romney
said that “the cost of health care would be re-
duced” and the plan would make health insur-
ance “affordable” for every Massachusetts citi-
zen.27 Supporters suggested that the reforms
would reduce the price of individual insurance
policies by 25–40 percent.28
In reality, insurance premiums rose by 7.4
percent in 2007, 8–12 percent in 2008, and are
expected to rise 9 percent this year.29 By com-
parison, nationwide insurance costs rose by
6.1 percent in 2007, just 4.7 percent in 2008,
and are projected to increase 6.4 percent this
year.30 On average, health insurance costs
$16,897 for a family of four in Massachusetts,
compared to $12,700 nationally.31
The five insurance plans available through
the Massachusetts Commonwealth Care pro-
gram, which subsidized care for low- and mid-
dle-income individuals, are somewhat cheap-
er, roughly $2,460–3,460 for an individual
policy before application of the subsidy, but
those costs, too, have been rising—up 11 per-
cent since the program began for the lowest-
cost plans.32 Moreover, the initial low cost for
these plans was widely attributed to low bids
from two insurers who were attempting to
gain customer share through the program’s
automatic assignment process. (Individuals
participating in Commonwealth Care who do
not choose an insurer are assigned to one. The
lowest-bid plan receives the majority of
assignees, with others receiving assignments
based on how close their premiums are to the
low bid.)33 Having used their initial low bids as
“loss leaders,” these insurers are now pressing
for substantial premium increases.
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Massachusetts has always been among the
states with the highest-cost insurance. In
part, this is due to the type of technology-
intensive medicine practiced in the state and
to the domination of the state’s insurance
market by a few large insurers. But, it is also
partly due to the state’s insurance regula-
tions, including community rating and some
40 mandated benefits.34
The reforms failed to deal with either of
those issues. They failed to create the type of
consumer incentives that would encourage
consumers to become more cost conscious.
Since the bill was signed, healthcare spending
in the state increased by 23 percent.35 And it
generally retained the regulations and man-
dates that added to insurance costs.36 In fact,
the legislation established a new health care
bureaucracy, the Connector, which has actu-
ally increased insurance regulation, and may
have helped drive up costs. 
The Massachusetts Health Care Connector
was designed to combine the current small
group and individual markets under a single
unified set of regulations.37 In addition to try-
ing to unify and rationalize two admittedly
dysfunctional regulatory schemes, the Con-
nector was also meant as way to allow workers
to purchase individual insurance while receiv-
ing the same tax break as for employer-provid-
ed insurance, thereby breaking the link be-
tween employment and insurance. This would
give workers portable personal insurance that
they could take with them from job to job, and
which they would not lose when they lost their
job. Unfortunately, the Connector has not
lived up to its promise in the latter regard. In
fact, as of May 2008, only 18,122 people had
purchased insurance through the Con-
nector.38
On the other hand, as some critics feared,
the Connector has become an aggressive new
regulatory body. To qualify under the man-
date, the Connector has decreed that insur-
ance must now (1) include prescription drug
coverage; (2) cover preventive care services; (3)
have a deductible of no more than $2,000 for
individuals or $4,000 for families, with drug
deductibles of no more than $250 for indi-
viduals and $500 for families; (4) have an in-
network out-of-pocket maximum (including
deductibles, co-payments, and coinsurance)
of no more than $5,000 for individuals and
$10,000 for families; and (5) have no limit on
annual or per sickness benefits.39
These rules do not apply just to the previ-
ously uninsured. Individuals who already had
health insurance, but whose insurance did not
meet these requirements, were required to give
up their current insurance and purchase
insurance that conformed to the new rules.
However, the state postponed the application
of the requirements for those who currently
have noncomplying insurance until January 1,
2009, meaning that we do not yet have infor-
mation on how many Massachusetts residents
were required to switch plans.
In addition, the Connector adds its own
administrative costs, estimated at 4 percent of
premium costs, for plans that are sold through
it.40
Massachusetts health reformers rejected
proposals that would have reduced the rising
cost of health insurance, such as eliminating
regulations that drive up insurance premiums
or those that limit competition in the insur-
ance industry. Nor did they create incentives,
such as increased cost-sharing, for consumers
to become more value-conscious in their pur-
chasing decisions. Instead, they increased reg-
ulatory costs and then simply threw money at
the system through subsidies. 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the cost of
health care (and health insurance) in Massa-
chusetts continues to rise. 
Busting the Budget
When the Massachusetts reforms first
became law, they were projected to cost about
$1.56 billion per year in total, with the largest
component, the Commonwealth Care subsi-
dies, costing roughly $725 million per year.
As it turns out, those estimates were not even
close.
By mid 2008, the state was projecting that
Commonwealth Care would cost $869 million
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for FY2009, nearly a 20 percent increase, and
more than $880 million in 2010.41 However,
the state secretary of administration and
finance says that she expects actual costs to be
far higher—perhaps even as much as $100 mil-
lion higher.42 The entire reform plan was pro-
jected to cost more than $1.9 billion in 2009,
some $300 million above projections.43 State
government spending on all health care pro-
grams has increased by 42 percent ($595 mil-
lion) since 2006.44
Part of the spending increase can be traced
to greater than anticipated participation. That
is, more people qualified for subsidies than
was expected. Supporters of the program
focus on this aspect, and excuse the growing
cost as the price of extending coverage. But,
beyond increased participation, the program’s
growing cost can also be traced to the failure
of the program to reduce health care and
insurance costs.
As Massachusetts State Senator Jamie
Eldridge, one of the early supporters of the
plan, recently told a congressional forum: 
The assumption was that, as more peo-
ple—and, in particular, more young and
relatively healthy people—joined the sys-
tem, premiums would go down across
the board. There was also the assump-
tion that as more people became in-
sured, the number of people going to the
emergency room would drop dramati-
cally, saving the Commonwealth money.
Neither of those things happened. . . . In
fact, health reform has cost the Com-
monwealth much more than expected.45
At the same time that spending for the
reforms was skyrocketing, revenues for the
plan were shrinking. For example, assess-
ments under the “play or pay” mandate on
businesses were expected to bring in $45 mil-
lion in its first year and $36 million in 2008.
In actuality, it failed to generate any revenue
in 2007 and just $7 million in 2008.46 And as
Senator Eldridge noted, expected savings
from reductions in uncompensated care also
failed to materialize. 
With the health care program expected to
contribute as much as one-third of the state’s
expected $1.3 billion budget deficit in 2008,
Governor Deval Patrick and the legislature
imposed a $1 per pack increase in the state’s
cigarette tax to help pay for the program. The
regressive tax increase, which falls most heav-
ily on the state’s low-income residents, is pro-
jected to raise $154 million annually. The
state also imposed approximately $89 mil-
lion in fees and assessments on health care
providers and insurers. On the cost-control
side, the state imposed some modest cost-
sharing increases on Commonwealth Care
participants. And as mentioned, the state has
begun a review of Commonwealth Care eligi-
bility.
Despite these efforts, both cost increases
and revenue shortfall are projected indefi-
nitely into the future. Nearly all observers
agree that without a concerted effort to con-
trol costs, the program is unsustainable. 
Naturally there is talk of additional tax
hikes. In particular, Patrick and Democratic
leaders in the Massachusetts legislature are
talking about an increase in the $295 assess-
ment for businesses that do not provide health
insurance.47 But the state’s ability to raise addi-
tional revenue may be constrained, especially
in the face of the economic downturn and an
FY2009 state budget shortfall that could top
$2.4 billion.48
Already, the rules for compliance with the
business mandate have been subtly changed in
a way that will raise costs for many small busi-
nesses. The legislation originally required
businesses to either cover 33 percent of the
cost of premiums for their employees or have
at least 25 percent of their full-time employees
enrolled in their company plan. However, last
year the legislature changed the “or” to “and.”
Small businesses are most likely to have diffi-
culty in meeting both requirements. Many will
find themselves facing either significant in-
creases in the cost of employing workers or
being required to pay the noncompliance
assessment.49
In addition, Patrick has threatened both
insurers and health care providers with price
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controls. Insurers participating in the Com-
monwealth Care program were ordered to cut
reimbursements to providers by 3–5 percent.50
There appears to have been little follow-
through on that front, so Patrick has now cho-
sen to attack the insurers directly. “Frankly, it’s
very hard for the average consumer, or frankly
the average governor, to understand how
some of these companies can have the mar-
gins they do and the annual increases in pre-
miums that they do,” Patrick mused to the
media, shortly before announcing that he
would explore whether the state had the pow-
er to regulate cap premiums.51
The state may even resort to explicit
rationing. In 2008, the legislature established a
special commission to investigate the health
payment system in a search for ways to control
costs.52 In March 2009, the commission re-
leased a list of options that it was considering,
including “exclud[ing] coverage of services of
low priority/low value” under insurance plans
offered through Commonwealth Care. Along
the same lines, it has also suggested that Com-
monwealth Care plans “limit coverage to ser-
vices that produce the highest value when con-
sidering both clinical effectiveness and cost.”53 And,
while such moves would initially only impact
those receiving subsidized coverage, the state is
also considering “a limitation on the total
amount of money available for health care ser-
vices,” which is a global budget—the hallmark
of government-run health care systems like
that in Canada.
Shortages and Waiting Lists
Experience with national health care sys-
tems around the world has long shown that
insurance coverage does not necessarily equate
to access to care. Massachusetts is beginning
to learn that lesson.
As we saw above, the Massachusetts reforms
have expanded the number of people with
health insurance in the state. Not surprisingly,
increased coverage has led to increased utiliza-
tion. But, at the same time, Massachusetts has
done nothing to increase its supply of pro-
viders. Indeed, to the degree that it ratchets
down on reimbursements, it may reduce that
supply. Anecdotal reports suggest that a num-
ber of physicians are limiting their practice or
refusing to accept new patients.54
The inevitable result of an increased de-
mand chasing a finite supply (in the absence of
any form of price rationing) has always been
shortages. The impact has been small so far. In
2007, 4.8 percent of state residents reported
forgoing care because they could not find a
doctor or get an appointment, an increase of
1.3 percentage points since the legislation was
signed. For low-income residents, the problem
was slightly worse: 6.9 percent couldn’t find a
doctor or get an appointment—a 2.7 percent-
age point hike since 2006.55Waiting times were
a somewhat bigger problem, with the wait for
seeing an internist, for example, increasing
from 33 days to 52 days during the program’s
first year.56
However, in the future, the problems are
likely to grow worse, especially if the state fol-
lows through on threats to enact cuts in reim-
bursements and premium caps on insurance
(which will almost inevitably be reflected in
reimbursement cuts, and/or global budget-
ing). Such policies can only further reduce the
supply of providers, leading to more short-
ages, more difficulty in finding a doctor, and a
longer waiting time if you can find one.
Conclusion
When Massachusetts passed its pioneer-
ing health care reforms, this critic warned
that it would result in “a slow but steady spi-
ral downward toward a government-run
health care system.”57 Sadly, three years later,
those predictions appear to be coming true.
At a time when other states are thinking of
copying Massachusetts, and, perhaps more
significantly, the “Massachusetts model” is
being discussed as a possible blueprint for
national reform, the failures in Massachusetts
provide valuable lessons for reformers. 
Notably, “universal coverage” should not be
the primary goal of health care reform. The key
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issue in health-care reform is not coverage, but
freedom—and secondarily, cost. But Massa-
chusetts reformers made universal coverage the
lynchpin of their efforts at the expense of any
serious effort to control health care costs. As the
New York Timesnoted, “Those who led the 2006
effort said it would not have been feasible to
enact universal coverage if the legislation had
required heavy cost controls.”58 As a result, they
pushed for universal coverage now, and put off
“until another day any serious effort to control
the state’s runaway health costs.”59
This was a guaranteed recipe for explod-
ing program costs, and is likely now to lead
to price controls and other restrictions that
will adversely affect the availability and qual-
ity of health care. 
Yet Congress and the Obama administra-
tion seem determined to head down the same
exact road. The focus of their health care
efforts appears likely to be a series of man-
dates and subsidies in an elusive search for
universal coverage.60 There is even likely to be
a new government-run (and taxpayer subsi-
dized) program similar to Medicare that will
operate in “competition” with private insur-
ance.61 They would essentially create a new
entitlement program, without taking any
steps to control rising health care costs. 
Already the administration’s reform plans
are expected to cost more $1.5 trillion over
the next 10 years.62 It will therefore be neces-
sary either to run up more national debt—at
a time when massive future budget deficits
threaten to bankrupt the country—or to
break President Obama’s pledge not to raise
taxes on the middle class.63
And, without any other options, Congress
will follow the Massachusetts model and
turn to price controls and rationing. Thus,
Americans will end up with the worst of all
possible worlds: runaway costs and higher
taxes followed by bureaucratic control over
our health care choices.
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis
rightly called American state governments “the
laboratories of democracy.”64 Under our feder-
alist system of government, states are able to
experiment with policies on a small scale
before these policies are adopted by the whole
nation. Of course, not all experiments are suc-
cessful. And we can learn just as much from
those that fail as from those that succeed.
When it comes to health care reform, Mas-
sachusetts has provided us with just such an
experiment. Three years of experience shows
that giving the government greater control
over our health care system will have grave
consequences for taxpayers, providers, and
health care consumers. That is the true lesson
of the Massachusetts model.
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